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Abstract 
 
 
Based on the premise that groups’ social standing and regard depend on their prototypicality 
for superordinate categories, minorities can be understood to suffer from the fact that they are 
considered as less prototypical than majorities. Previous research has shown that complex (vs 
simple) representations of superordinate categories can reduce majority members’ tendency 
to perceive their ingroup as more prototypical than the outgroup. The current research tested 
whether such complex representations also  increase minorities’ own perceived relative 
ingroup prototypicality (RIP), leading to more balanced prototypicality judgments from both 
majorities and minorities. In Study 1 (N = 76), an experiment with two artificial groups of 
unequal status, a complex representation of a superordinate category increased the 
comparatively low RIP of the lower-status subgroup. Consistently, in Study 2 (N = 192), a 
correlational study with natural groups, the relation between perceived complexity of the 
superordinate category and RIP was positive for members of the lower-status group but 
negative for members of the higher-status comparison group. In Study 3 (N =  160), an 
experiment with natural groups, a more complex representation of the superordinate category 
led lower and higher-status groups to perceive greater equality in terms of relative 
prototypicality not only for a positive but also for a negatively valued superordinate category. 
These results have important implications for the understanding of social change:  As 
superordinate identity complexity implies that included subgroups are more equally 
prototypical, it offers a normative alternative that helps minorities to challenge asymmetric 
status relations vis-à-vis majorities, but also promotes hope that majorities show 
bipartisanship in supporting such social change.   
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What does it mean to be American? What does it mean to be European? What does it 
mean to be human? Far from being vain navel-gazing, endeavours to define our identity have 
critical implications for our social and political life: they determine who is in and who is 
outside the group, and who represents more or less what is valued about our group. They 
imply the scope of our moral community and to whom we extend justice concerns (Opotow, 
1990), as well as the relative status, influence and entitlements of those included (Wenzel, 
2004). They define shared, similar values that may determine unshared, differentiating 
privileges.  
According to self-categorization theory (Turner, 1987) (sub-)groups are evaluated, 
and attitudes towards them differ, in terms of their relative prototypicality for superordinate 
categories (i.e., categories inclusive of these groups). Therefore, to the degree that 
prototypicality beliefs are shared within such superordinate groups they provide the basis for 
the legitimization of social status differences between groups: More prototypical subgroups 
are seen as more deserving of what membership in the superordinate category has to offer, for 
instance in terms of prestige, access to resources or social power (Weber, Mummendey, & 
Waldzus, 2002; Wenzel, 2004). Minorities (numerically underrepresented and/or socially 
disadvantaged) often suffer from the fact that they are seen as non-prototypical and thus of 
lower status and less deserving of resources, privileges and power. The current research seeks 
to identify conditions under which minorities may escape this predicament by plausibly 
claiming higher prototypicality, towards being seen to be equally prototypical as the majority. 
The point of departure of our analysis is that the prototypicality of social groups is not 
carved in stone. Prototypicality judgments are dynamic and adaptive, depending on socio-
cognitive and motivational factors (see Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1998; Wenzel, Waldzus, & 
Steffens, in press). The perceived prototypicality of a specific subgroup depends, for instance, 
on the frame of reference used for intergroup comparisons (Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty, 
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& Hayes, 1992; Waldzus, Mummendey, & Wenzel, 2005), on the cognitive availability of 
subgroup prototype information (Machunsky & Meiser, 2014) and on group members’ level 
of identification with their subgroup and the superordinate category (Waldzus, Mummendey, 
Wenzel, & Weber, 2003; Wenzel, Mummendey, Weber, & Waldzus, 2003). Because of their 
social relevance, public prototypicality claims also depend on political objectives, that is, on 
the function that high or low relative prototypicality of a certain group has in a specific 
political context (e.g., in contexts involving separatist tendencies; Sindic & Reicher, 2008). 
Of the several factors determining subgroups’ relative prototypicality, three are addressed in 
the current research: Ingroup projection, relative social status and the complexity of the 
representation of the superordinate category. 
Ingroup Projection 
According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) members of a given group 
establish the value or positive distinctiveness of their ingroup by comparing it with one or 
more outgroup(s) on relevant valued comparison dimensions. Social categorization, as a 
dynamic process, has therefore an important identity function, but also the potential to 
establish psychological divisions between groups.  According to the ingroup projection model 
(Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999) groups often use the prototype of a superordinate category as 
an ethnocentric comparison standard, either by projecting their distinctive ingroup attributes 
to the prototype of the superordinate category, or by holding an ingroup stereotype that is 
more similar to this superordinate prototype than the outgroup’s is. Whether the process goes 
one way (endorsing a superordinate prototype that is more similar to the ingroup) or the other 
(endorsing an ingroup stereotype that is more similar to the superordinate prototype), the 
result is that members tend to view their own subgroup as relatively prototypical. The term 
ingroup projection is used “as a short general label for the perception, or claim, of the 
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ingroup’s greater relative prototypicality for the superordinate group” (Wenzel, Mummendey 
& Waldzus, 2007, p. 337).  
Research has supported this assumption. For example, Devos and Banaji (2005) found 
that White Americans regarded the prototype of Americans as being White (see also Devos & 
Heng, 2009). In a study by Peker, Crisp, and Hogg (2010), when characterizing “Britishness” 
White English participants reported values and attitudes typically associated with White 
English. Bianchi, Mummendey, Steffens and Yzerbyt (2010) showed that both German and 
Italian participants implicitly associated more attributes of their ingroup with the word 
European than the respective other group of participants did. And Imhoff, Dotsch, Bianchi, 
Banse, and Wigboldus (2011) found in a reversed correlation paradigm that German 
participants’ imagination of a typically European face resembled more a typically German 
face than Portuguese participants’ imagination of a typically European face did. Overall, 
there is good evidence that prototypicality judgments depend on group membership, with a 
general tendency of ingroup projection (Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel & Boetcher, 2004; 
Waldzus et al., 2005).  
Ingroup projection has a motivational component as it serves to achieve positive 
ingroup distinctiveness, but it can also be the basis for ingroup favouritism and lead to 
negative attitudes towards outgroups, which are seen as rather non-prototypical and thus as 
deviant within the superordinate category (Waldzus & Mummendey, 2004; Waldzus et al., 
2005; Waldzus et al., 2003; Wenzel et al., 2003). It is therefore in the interest of group 
members to see their ingroup as rather prototypical. Accordingly, Mummendey and Wenzel 
(1999) propose, and research has found (Waldzus et al., 2003; Wenzel et al., 2003), that if 
members identify strongly with both the superordinate category and their ingroup they are 
more likely to seek their ingroup’s positive distinctiveness in terms of prototypicality for the 
superordinate category. Thus, they are particularly biased towards portraying their own group 
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as relatively prototypical and engage in ingroup projection, accommodating their group’s 
stereotype to the prototype of the inclusive category, or assimilating the prototype of the 
inclusive category to their group’s stereotype (Wenzel et al., 2007). Hence, highly identified 
White Americans may portray the prototype of Americans as even ‘Whiter’, whereas highly 
identified African Americans may regard it as more ‘Black’. Or, highly identified Germans in 
particular may perceive themselves as more prototypically European than others see them 
(Bianchi et al., 2010; see also Imhoff et al., 2011; Waldzus et al., 2003).  
Relative Status 
Group members, however, are not completely free in the level of prototypicality they 
can claim for their ingroup. Their claims are constrained by group members’ perception of 
‘social reality’ (Ellemers, van Rijswijk, Roefs, & Simons, 1997). Within superordinate 
categories members tend to hold and, to a certain degree, share between subgroups beliefs 
about social reality, including the relative prototypicality of subgroups.  
Majorities have for several reasons an advantage with regard to prototypicality claims 
when compared with minority subgroups. As social categories are socially constructed, group 
members may rely in their prototypicality judgments on several cues that are consensually 
considered as informative to subgroups’ prototypicality, such as exposure to or familiarity 
with subgroup members (giving an advantage to numerical majorities) or the subgroups’ 
relative social status (giving an advantage to more highly regarded groups). Moreover, based 
on existing power differences and dominant narratives or ideologies, members of higher-
status groups may be more influential than lower-status groups in framing the shared belief 
system in terms of their own tendency of ingroup projection (Waldzus et al., 2004).  
In contrast, members of lower-status groups are more likely to concede and accept a 
belief in social reality that is biased towards the higher status group’s prototypicality. In line 
with this reasoning, research has shown that in asymmetric status relations ingroup projection 
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is limited by consensual asymmetries in prototypicality. For instance, in a study by Waldzus 
et al. (2004) both East-Germans and West-Germans agreed that West-Germans were more 
prototypically German than East-Germans were (while there still was, consistent with the 
ingroup projection model, a certain disagreement between the groups about the degree of 
West-Germans’ higher prototypicality). In another study, Devos and Banaji (2005) showed 
that different American subgroups (Asian Americans, Black Americans, White Americans) 
associated White Americans more strongly than Asian Americans with the category of 
America. Thus, the degree of relative prototypicality that lower status groups can claim, or 
believe in, is often limited by asymmetric status relations that are taken for granted as part of 
social reality. 
Complexity of Representation of the Superordinate Category 
Ingroup projection manifests itself in disagreement between groups about their 
relative prototypicality and therefore may result in potentially problematic intergroup 
conflict. From this perspective, consensual beliefs about the superordinate identity and the 
subgroups’ relative prototypicality would be a welcome antidote against such intergroup 
disagreement and conflict (Wenzel et al., in press). However, when the consensual beliefs 
entail higher prototypicality of the socially advantaged they may also legitimize social 
inequality and discrimination, as discussed. That is, people may tend to accept the unequal 
treatment of people based on their membership in a social group such as race, ethnicity, 
gender, sexual orientation, nationality and so on, because they buy into the narrative of 
unequal prototypicality between groups (Jost & Hunyady, 2002). It is therefore important for 
social psychology to identify conditions under which groups may develop more balanced 
judgments of relative prototypicality between groups.  
One important determinant of group members’ prototypicality judgments is the form 
in which superordinate categories are cognitively represented. According to Mummendey and 
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Wenzel (1999) a complex (vs. simple) representation of the superordinate category, one that 
is defined by multiple prototypical positions on relevant comparison dimensions, should 
reduce group members’ tendency to perceive their ingroup as more prototypical than the 
outgroup. For a complex superordinate category no group occupying one such position could 
alone represent the whole inclusive category; in other words, the subgroups would be equally 
“indispensable” for the representation of the superordinate category (Verkuyten, Martinovic, 
& Smeekes, 2014). Research has supported this hypothesis. For example, when German 
participants were instructed to think about and describe what constitutes the diversity of 
Europe (as compared to the unity of Europe in the control condition), thus making salient a 
complex representation of the inclusive category, their perceptions of relative ingroup 
prototypicality (RIP) were reduced and, mediated by RIP, their attitudes towards the salient 
outgroup (Poles) improved (Waldzus et al., 2003; see also Peker et al., 2010; Waldzus et al., 
2005).  
The Current Research 
As suggested by Mummendey and Wenzel (1999), complex representations of 
superordinate categories should reduce members’ inclination to see their own group as more 
prototypical than the outgroup, thus decreasing social discrimination and increasing 
tolerance. However, their analysis decidedly focused on the common perpetrators of social 
discrimination and intolerance, and did not consider the case of minorities who would view 
themselves as relatively low in prototypicality to start with. Extending the ingroup projection 
model to the case of asymmetric status relations we propose that the effects of complex 
representations of superordinate categories on the perceived RIP of minorities should be 
opposite to those for majority, high-status groups: Complex representations should increase 
rather than decrease the perceived RIP of minorities. To the extent that eliciting complex 
representations render subgroups more equally necessary and indispensable for the 
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superordinate identity, minority members should start seeing their ingroup as more 
prototypical, and the majority as less prototypical, compared with a simple representation that 
tends to be dominated by the majority. Minority members should be emboldened to regard 
their own group as equally prototypical. 
This argument is consistent with research findings on majorities’ and minorities’ 
preferences for more or less complex representations of superordinate categories. According 
to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), when asymmetric status relations are 
insecure (unstable and/or illegitimate) majority group members should be motivated to 
preserve a system that advantages them whereas minority group members can be expected to 
try to enhance their status, for instance by engaging in action for social change and social 
competition. Such motivations have been found to have direct implications for preferred 
group representations. For instance, research on the common ingroup identity model 
(Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) has found that members of higher-status groups are likely to 
endorse a one-group representation of the intergroup situation, while members of lower status 
groups rather endorse a dual-identity representation. For example, Ryan, Hunt, Weible, 
Peterson and Casas (2007) found stronger preferences for one-group representations for 
Whites and dual-identity representations for Blacks, particularly among those more highly 
identified with their group (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Kafati, 2000). Arguably, a one-group 
representation corresponds to a less complex representation than a dual-identity, in which 
both common ingroup identity and subgroup identity are equally salient (Dovidio, Gaertner, 
& Saguy, 2009). In line with these findings, in a set of studies with adolescents and young 
adults in Europe, Verkuyten (2006) found consistently that minority group members 
supported multiculturalism (implying a complex representation) more than majority group 
members did. Finally, there is evidence that majority group members and participants who 
consider their ingroup prototypical of the superordinate group show uneasiness or feel 
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threatened when confronted with the idea of increasing diversity of a superordinate category 
(Craig & Richeson, 2014; Danbold & Huo, 2015; Ehrke, Bethold, & Steffens, 2014; Outten, 
Schmitt, Miller, & Garcia, 2012). Complex representations of superordinate categories might 
be threatening to higher-status groups under some circumstances because they have the 
potential to eliminate legitimizing beliefs in asymmetric prototypicality by both reducing 
majorities’ and increasing minorities’ relative prototypicality.  
Although higher-status groups might be resisting it to a certain degree, if a complex 
representation of the superordinate category is induced successfully higher-status groups’ 
members are likely to concede that their group alone does not represent the superordinate 
category, that there are multiple prototypical positions equally valid for the inclusive group. 
Conversely, members of lower-status groups will see a complex superordinate category as an 
invitation to contest their traditionally lower prototypicality. Thus, complexity of inclusive 
categories may reduce inequality in terms of prototypicality, but that does not necessarily 
mean that the included subgroups would be more humble, conciliatory, harmony-oriented or 
consensus-seeking in their prototypicality claims. As complex representations of the inclusive 
category not only undermine the higher-status group’s ethnocentric self-perception but also 
relieve established ‘reality constraints’ for lower-status groups, they can be seen as a strategy 
to induce social change (see Dixon, Levine, Reicher, & Durrheim, 2012). 
In sum, we hypothesize that the effect of complex representations of a self-relevant 
superordinate category on RIP will be moderated by status. More specifically, a more 
complex representation of a positive superordinate category is expected to decrease RIP for 
higher-status groups, but increase it for lower-status groups. These hypotheses are tested in 
the first two studies. Study 3 will then extend the investigation to situations where the 
inclusive category is negatively valued and the meaning of prototypicality reverses. 
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Study 1 
In a laboratory experiment, participants were made believe to be members of an artificial 
ingroup and an artificial inclusive category, which also included an artificial outgroup. 
Relative group status and complexity of the representation of the inclusive category were 
manipulated and perceptions of ingroup and outgroup prototypicality were measured.  
Method 
Participants. The study was conducted online with Portuguese participants and in 
Portuguese language. Participants were recruited on a voluntary basis. An announcement of 
the study including a small description of the study and the link to the respective webpage 
was sent to several electronic mailing lists at a Portuguese university (e.g., undergraduate 
students). Out of 316 visitors, 138 completed the study. From these 138 we excluded the data 
of participants who indicated at the end that they did not take the study seriously and/or did 
not identify with either the inclusive category or the subgroup (indicated by identification 
ratings that were not higher than the scale midpoint). This decision was based on 
Mummendey and Wenzel’s (1999) assumption that sufficient identification with both 
subgroup and inclusive category is necessary for ingroup projection (Waldzus et al., 2003; 
Wenzel et al., 2003). The final sample consisted of 76 participants with a mean age of 30.1 
years (SD = 9.90), 64.5 % female. 
Procedure. The online study was created just for the purpose of our research by a 
software programmer. He used programming languages html and php. When participants 
opened the webpage they were shown the informed consent form. After agreeing to 
participate by clicking a button on this webpage they were introduced to the study. The study 
was announced as being on emotional intelligence and success on the job market. Participants 
were asked to participate in an alleged test of their Emotional Intelligence Quotient (EIQ). 
After answering the alleged test items, they were given false feedback that they were 
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members of the group of people with a high EIQ. This group was used as the shared inclusive 
category in the study. After a brief and general description of this category, a second alleged 
emotional intelligence test was performed. Through false feedback on the test results, 
participants learned about their membership in one of two subgroups within the High EIQ 
group: the Inductive Emotional Intelligent group or Deductive Emotional Intelligent group. 
Following this, relative ingroup status and cognitive representation of the shared inclusive 
category were manipulated and the dependent measures as well as the manipulation checks 
were presented. As an incentive for participating in the study participants were given the 
chance to win a EUR150 gift card. After the study finished, all participants were debriefed 
via email and the gift card was given to a randomly selected participant.  
Design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of eight conditions of a 2 
(relative ingroup status: lower vs. higher) X 2 (representation of the inclusive category: 
simple vs. complex) X 2 (subgroup categorization: inductive vs. deductive) design. The 
Inductive versus Deductive labels had no theoretical meaning, but they were included in the 
analyses to control for group-name effects. 
Manipulations. 
Relative ingroup status. Participants were informed about the relative status of their 
sub-group (after having been randomly assigned to either the Inductive Emotional Intelligent 
group or the Deductive Emotional Intelligent group). In the higher-status [lower-status] 
condition participants read the following text: “A great majority [Only a small number] of 
people belongs to the same subgroup as you. We have also been verifying that people 
belonging to the (ingroup) are socially more [less] valued than (outgroup) members; as a 
consequence the likelihood of being selected in job interviews is higher [lower] and (ingroup) 
members more [less] frequently achieve leadership positions”.   
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Complex representation of the inclusive category. Adopting a manipulation tested in 
previous studies (Waldzus et al., 2003, Study 2; Waldzus et al., 2005), in the complex 
condition a more complex representation was primed by the following instruction: “Imagine 
that you have to explain to another person the diversity of the group of high EIQ people. 
Which are the main characteristics that you think you need to mention? Even if this diversity 
idea is not an important issue for you or even if you do not have a very clear idea of the 
diversity of this group, think for a while about which characteristics you think you should 
mention in order to describe the diversity of people with a High EIQ”. In the simple condition 
participants were simply asked to produce a brief description of the inclusive category: 
“Imagine that you have to explain to another person what the high EIQ group is like. Even if 
you do not have a very clear idea about this issue, think for a while about which 
characteristics you think you should mention in order to describe what this group is like.” 
Participants wrote down their answers in an open text field. 
Measures. 
Manipulation checks. Relative ingroup status was measured by four items (α = .69) 
using 7-point scales (e.g., “In comparison to (outgroup) members, the status of (ingroup) 
members is…”; 1 = clearly  lower; to 7 = clearly higher; “In terms of social value, in 
comparison to (outgroup) members, (ingroup) members have…”; 1 = clearly less social 
value; to 7 = clearly more social value.)  
Five items were used to measure the complexity of the inclusive category, including 
two that were reversed-coded (e.g., “I think that there is not a single type of highly 
emotionally intelligent people”; “When I am thinking of a highly emotionally intelligent 
person a typical person comes easily to my mind”, reversed coded, α = .50). Responses were 
provided on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree). 
Higher scores indicate a more complex representation of the inclusive category.  
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Relative ingroup prototypicality. RIP was assessed by three different measures: (1) 
An indirect profile distance measure was adapted from the profile distance across attribute 
ratings used by Wenzel et al. (2003). Before running this experiment, 30 undergraduate 
students were asked to list attributes characterizing highly emotionally intelligent people. 
From all collected attributes we chose the 6 most frequently cited positive (e.g., 
comprehensive, calm) and the 6 most frequently cited negative attributes (e.g., intolerant, 
insensitive). Participants were asked to indicate on 7-point scales (1 = doesn’t apply at all; to 
7 = applies totally) the extent to which each attribute applied to the outgroup, the ingroup 
and, lastly, the inclusive category. Using an Euclidian Distance metric, that is, the square root 
of the mean of squared differences between the attribute ratings of each subgroup and the 
inclusive category, two profile distance scores were calculated: one representing the 
dissimilarity between the ingroup and the inclusive category (i.e., the non-prototypicality of 
the ingroup) and the other representing the dissimilarity between the outgroup and the 
inclusive category (i.e., the non-prototypicality of the outgroup). (2) A pictorial measure, 
originally used by Waldzus and Mummendey (2004), was based on graphic representations 
(see also Schubert & Otten, 2002). Participants were shown seven pictures in which a small 
circle, symbolizing the outgroup, varied in its distance to a big circle, symbolizing the 
inclusive category. Pictures were ordered vertically on the screen with increasing 
closeness/overlap towards the lower end of the screen. Participants rated how they perceived 
the similarity of the outgroup to the inclusive category by ticking the picture best representing 
their opinion. Pictures were coded from 1 (low prototypicality) to 7 (high prototypicality) 
according to the closeness/overlap of the circles. The typicality of the ingroup was measured 
in the same way. (3) A pictorial interactive prototypicality measure similar to the pictorial 
measure described before used a more interactive technique. A big circle, symbolizing the 
inclusive category was presented on top of the right extreme of a 7-point scale; every time 
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that participants clicked one of the options of the 7-point scale, a small circle symbolizing the 
outgroup (ingroup) appeared. The distance to the circle of the inclusive category varied 
according to the point of the scale that was clicked on; that is with repeated clicks participants 
could move the outgroup (ingroup) circle towards or away from the inclusive circle. By doing 
this they could visualize the distance of the outgroup (ingroup) from the inclusive category. 
After visualizing several or all the options participants decided on the most adequate option 
of the 7-point scale, with higher values representing higher prototypicality.  
Assuming that the three different measures have specific errors due to the different 
response format but share common variance of a latent prototypicality factor, two separate 
factor analyses were performed (Gorsuch, 1983) with the 3 measures of ingroup 
prototypicality and the three measures of outgroup prototypicality. Using a maximum 
likelihood extraction a single factor was extracted in both factor analyses, with eigenvalues of 
1.72 and 2.00 and explaining 41.1% and 57.4% of the variance of ingroup and outgroup 
prototypicality, respectively. The factor scores were used as indicators of ingroup and 
outgroup prototypicality with higher scores indicating higher prototypicality.  
Identification. Three items measured subgroup identification (e.g., “Being (ingroup) 
member is not an important part of my identity”, reversed coded) on a 7-point Likert scale 
from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree). An index with the 3 items was 
computed by recoding the two reversed items and averaging responses (α = .68). 
Identification with the inclusive category was measured with the same items but adapted to 
the inclusive category (α = .74). 
Results 
Manipulation checks. First, a 2 (representation of the inclusive category: simple vs. 
complex) x 2 (relative ingroup status: low vs. high) x 2 (subgroup categorization: inductive 
vs. deductive) univariate GLM was performed for the manipulation check of the complex 
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representation of the inclusive category. The only significant result was the expected main 
effect of the manipulation of the representation of the inclusive category, F(1, 68) = 7.17, p = 
.009, ηp2 = .10: In the complex condition participants perceived the shared inclusive category 
as being more complex (M = 4.16, SD = 0.66) than in the simple condition (M = 3.71, SD = 
0.75), indicating successful manipulation. 
A similar univariate GLM was performed with the status manipulation check as 
dependent variable. The only significant result was the expected main effect of status, F(1, 
68) = 22.1, p < .001, ηp2 = .24. Participants allocated to the higher-status condition perceived 
the ingroup as having a higher relative status (M = 4.44, SD = 0.66) than participants 
allocated to the lower-status condition (M = 3.74, SD = 0.67), again indicating successful 
manipulation.  
Effects of complexity of the inclusive category. The hypothesis was tested in a 
mixed 2 (prototypicality: ingroup vs. outgroup) x 2 (representation of the inclusive category: 
simple vs. complex) x 2 (relative ingroup status: low vs. high) x 2 (subgroup categorization: 
inductive vs. deductive) GLM with prototypicality as within subject factor. Effects on relative 
ingroup prototypicality are indicated by interactions with the prototypicality factor. 
Prototypicality interacted with relative ingroup status, F(1, 68) = 5.27, p =.02, ηp2 = .07. 
More importantly, we found the predicted significant interaction between relative ingroup 
status, representation of the inclusive category and prototypicality (ingroup vs. outgroup), 
F(1, 68) = 8.93, p = .004, ηp2 = .12. No other effect was significant. 
Running separate GLMs, we found that the interaction between status (high vs. low) 
and prototypicality (ingroup vs. outgroup) was, as predicted, only significant in the simple 
condition, F(1,33) = 14.69, p = .001, ηp2 = .31, but not in the complex condition,  
F(1,35) = 0.23, p = .64. Simple mean comparisons showed that in the simple condition 
members of the lower-status group perceived the ingroup as being less prototypical 
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(Mingroup = -0.28, SD = 0.63, F(1,33) = 6.82, p = .013, ηp2 = .17) and the outgroup as being 
more prototypical (Moutgroup = 0.35, SD = 0.65, F(1,33) = 2.94, p = .096, ηp2 = .08) than 
members of the higher-status group did (Mingroup = 0.29, SD = 0.67, Moutgroup = -0.18, 
SD = 1.10). As predicted, in the complex condition these differences disappeared (lower-
status: Mingroup = 0.08, SD = 0.74, Moutgroup = 0.03, SD = 1.13; higher-status: Mingroup = -0.13, 
SD = 1.18, Moutgroup = -0.14, SD = 1.00; ps > .50).  
Inspecting the three-way interaction from a different perspective, separate GLMs for 
the two status conditions revealed a marginal interaction between the complexity 
manipulation and prototypicality (ingroup vs. outgroup) for the higher-status group, F(1,36) 
= 3.41, p = .073, ηp2 = .09. As predicted, this interaction was reversed and significant for the 
lower-status group, F(1,32) = 6.05, p = .02, ηp2  = .16  (see Figure 1 for effects on RIP).  
[Insert Figure 1] 
 
Finally, in order to examine whether the three-way interaction was driven more by 
changes in ingroup prototypicality or by changes in outgroup prototypicality we ran separate 
GLMs with each of these two indices as dependent variables. For effects on ingroup 
prototypicality we found a marginal interaction between status and complexity, F(1,68) = 
3.96, p = .05, ηp2  = .06. This interaction was the opposite, but not significant for outgroup 
prototypicality, F(1,68) = 0.91, p = .35, ηp2  = .01. Thus, effects seemed to be driven more 
strongly by changes in ingroup prototypicality. 
Discussion 
Study 1 used artificial groups to test whether relative status moderates the effect of a 
complex representation of a common inclusive category on the perception of RIP. The 
findings support our general hypothesis: Increasing the complexity of the representation of a 
shared inclusive category had the opposite effect on perceptions of RIP for the lower-status as 
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compared to the higher-status group. We conclude that if a simpler representation of the 
inclusive category is made salient, members of a lower-status group conform to the social 
status hierarchy assuming relatively low ingroup prototypicality, which can reflect how social 
construction of reality affects groups holding inferior status positions (Ellemers et al., 1997; 
Major & O’Brien, 2005; Ufkes, Otten, Van der Zee, Giebels, & Dovidio, 2012). In contrast, 
when a more complex representation of that inclusive category is activated, lower-status 
group members may sense that the higher-status group cannot reasonably and legitimately 
assume to represent that category and its prototype alone. The prototype is not unitary but 
rather manifold: diverse groups can be normative. In the context of a complex representation 
of the inclusive category lower-status groups can claim greater equality in relative 
prototypicality; likewise, higher-status groups would concede such greater equality. For 
lower-status groups this implies that complexity of the inclusive category increases their 
claim for prototypicality, while for higher-status groups it reduces such claims.  
Study 2 
In order to test the external validity of these results we conducted a second study 
using real-life groups. Previous research had found complexity effects with natural groups 
(Waldzus et al., 2003, Waldzus et al., 2005), but so far only with majorities. The aim of Study 
2 is, therefore, to test the same hypothesis as in Study 1 but in a real-life context, namely in 
the relations between immigrant groups and the host community in Portugal. 
Method 
Design. Relative ingroup status was varied quasi-experimentally (lower-status 
immigrant group vs. higher-status Portuguese group) and complex representation of the 
shared inclusive category was measured.  
Participants and procedure. Participants were recruited in different suburbs of 
Lisbon (Portugal) with a high concentration of immigrant population. The total sample was 
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composed by 192 participants from different groups: Cape Verdeans (N = 58), Brazilians (N 
= 79) and Portuguese (N = 55). Participants were informed that these labels referred in this 
particular questionnaire to people living in Portugal but with Cape Verdean, Brazilian or 
Portuguese origin, respectively. The mean age was 32 (SD = 9.9); 111 were female and 77 
male (4 participants did not indicate their sex) 1. 
The researcher invited participants individually to fill in a questionnaire about social 
groups that live in Portugal.  The inclusive category used in this study – “group of people 
living in Portugal” - was chosen based on results of a set of interviews that we conducted 
previously with experts of different minority groups living in Portugal with the purpose of 
obtaining a contextualized and ecologically valid operationalization of our main variables. 
Participants were asked to give their opinions about different social groups. Minority 
groups were asked to compare themselves with members of the higher-status group 
(Portuguese) while  Portuguese participants were asked to compare themselves either with 
Cape Verdeans (N = 25) or with Brazilians (N = 30). At the end participants were rewarded 
with a 5-Euro voucher. 
Measures. 
Representation of the inclusive category. Participants were asked to rate on 7-point 
Likert scales how complex they perceived the inclusive category to be (e.g., “One of the 
characteristics of Portugal is its diversity”). Two items were reversed-coded (e.g., “When 
thinking of people living in Portugal, one type of person comes easily to my mind”). A scale 
score was created by averaging the responses on all three items (α = .60). A higher score 
indicated a complex representation of the superordinate category.  
Relative ingroup status and power perceptions. Four pictorial measures were 
developed to measure intergroup status and power perceptions. Each pictorial measure 
showed a vertical arrow pointing to the top, with 7 horizontal lines. For the measures of status 
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[power] perceptions, the bottom line represented the lowest and the upper line the highest 
status [power] position. Participants were asked to indicate on each of the vertical 7-point 
scales the perceived status [power] of ingroup and outgroup. A score of relative ingroup 
status [power] was created as the difference of ingroup status [power] and outgroup status 
[power].  
Relative ingroup prototypicality. Three different measures were used. First, we used a 
pictorial measure as described in Study 1 and calculated a RIP index by subtracting the 
outgroup prototypicality from the ingroup prototypicality. The second measure was an 
explicit ingroup prototypicality measure composed of three items (e.g., “When I think of the 
“true” people that live in Portugal I think of the…”) using 7-point scales, with 1 indicating 
[Outgroup] as the most prototypical and 7 [Ingroup] as the most prototypical. Responses 
were averaged across the three items (α = .78). The third measure was a profile distance 
measure similar to the one used in Study 1 but with different attributes2, depending on the 
given immigrant group: For comparisons between Cape Verdean immigrants and Portuguese 
the attributes were happy, quarrelsome, aggressive, cultural, irresponsible, hard-working, 
intelligent, racist. For comparisons between Brazilian immigrants and Portuguese the 
attributes were happy, closed-minded, hard-working, serious, cold, extroverted, unpleasant, 
funny. The content of the attributes was chosen in order to cover ecologically valid 
comparison dimensions. Note, however, that what is important for the measure itself is not 
the content of the attributes but rather the extent to which these attributes apply to the 
different social categories. Therefore, using a 7-point scale (1 = does not apply at all to 7 = 
applies totally), participants were asked to indicate the extent to which each attribute applied 
to the outgroup, the ingroup and, lastly, the shared inclusive category. Similar to Study 1, two 
profile distance scores were calculated as the square root of the mean of squared attribute 
differences between the ratings of each subgroup and the common inclusive category, 
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representing the dissimilarity between the ingroup/outgroup and the inclusive category. A 
RIP score was calculated by subtracting the profile distance score of the ingroup from the one 
of the outgroup. 
A factor analysis with the three different measures of relative prototypicality was 
performed. Using a maximum likelihood extraction only one factor was retained with an 
eigenvalue of 1.36 explaining 45.24% of the variance. The factor score was used as indicator 
of RIP with higher values indicating higher ingroup and lower outgroup prototypicality.   
Identification. Ten items each measured identification with the subgroup (α = .88) 
and the inclusive category, (α = .90); for example, “Being (ingroup) member [member of the 
group of people living in Portugal] is an important part of my identity”. The answers were 
provided on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree).   
Results 
Identification. Identification with the ingroup and with the inclusive category were 
both above the scale midpoint (Mingroup = 5.47, SD = 1.1; Minclusive category = 4.54, SD = 1.2).   
Check of status differences. We created a new variable labeled ‘relative group 
status’ with two categories representing membership in either the group of Portuguese (1) or 
in one of the immigrant groups (0). In order to control for eventual differences between the 
two intergroup contexts, another categorical variable labeled ‘intergroup context’ was created 
and coded 0 for participants who were Brazilian immigrants or Portuguese comparing 
themselves with Brazilians and coded 1 for participants who were Cape Verdean immigrants 
or Portuguese comparing themselves with Cape Verdeans.  
In order to check the expected status and power asymmetries we performed 2 (relative 
group status: Portuguese vs. immigrant group) x 2 (intergroup context: Cape Verdeans vs. 
Brazilians) univariate GLMs with the indexes of perceived relative ingroup status and power 
as dependent measures. Results showed the expected significant main effect of relative group 
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status on perceived relative status, F(1, 180) = 115.60, p < .001, ηp2 = .39), and on perceived 
power, F(1, 180) = 163.80, p < .001, ηp2 = .48. As expected immigrant participants perceived 
the ingroup as having a lower relative status position (M = -1.0, SD = 1.9) and as having 
relatively less power (M = -1.8, SD = 1.9) than participants of the Portuguese group did (M = 
1.9, SD = 1.6, and M = 2.3, SD = 2.1, respectively). We also found a main effect of 
intergroup context on relative status, F(1, 180) = 6.50, p = .012, ηp2 = .03, but not for power, 
F(1, 180) = 0.15, p = .70, and a marginal interaction effect between both factors on relative 
status, F(1, 180) = 3.70, p = .06, ηp2 = .02. This effect means that Brazilians perceived the 
ingroup as having a better status position (M = -0.47, SD = 2.1) than Cape Verdeans did (M = 
-1.7, SD = 1.4). Despite the difference between the two immigrant groups, however, they 
both perceived the ingroup as having a lower status than Portuguese, ts(78) > 2.36, ps < .02.  
Testing the moderation hypothesis.  Following Aiken and West (1991) we included 
complexity of the inclusive category (centred), relative ingroup status and intergroup context 
(both dummy coded) as predictors of RIP in the first step of a hierarchical multiple regression 
analysis, adjusted R2 = .342, F(3, 178) = 31.72, p < .001.  Adding the two-way interactions 
(product scores) as predictors in the second step, adjusted R2 = .41, F(6, 175) = 20.17, p < 
.001, increased significantly the explained variance of RIP, ∆R2 = .06, Fchange (3, 175) = 5.97, 
p = .001. Both relative ingroup status (β = .56, p < .001) and perceived complexity (β = .18, p 
= .022) were significant predictors. More importantly, in line with our hypothesis, the 
interaction between measured complexity and relative group status was highly significant, β 
= -.27, p < .001. As expected, adding the three-way interaction in a final model (model 3) as 
predictor did not increase the explained variance, Fchange (1, 180) = 1.90, p = .17, ∆R2 < .01, 
indicating that the findings did not differ significantly between immigrant contexts. 
Results of separate linear regressions for the higher and the lower-status groups were 
in line with our hypothesis: A more complex representation of the common inclusive 
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category was negatively related with RIP for higher-status group’s members, β = -.31, p = 
.022, but positively related with RIP for lower status groups’ members, β = .34, p < .001. The 
latter applied to both, Brazilian (β = .27, p = .025) and Cape Verdean participants (β = .47, p 
< .001).  
We examined, as in Study 1, whether the predicted interaction for relative 
prototypicality was more strongly driven by differences in ingroup prototypicality or in 
outgroup prototypicality. However, we could not use the explicit prototypicality measure as it 
pitted these two already against each other on the item level. Thus, we subtracted the scores 
of the profile distance measure of prototypicality from 7 so that that they had the same scale 
from 1 to 7 (with higher scores indicating higher prototypicality) as the pictorial 
prototypicality measure. Then we created two composite prototypicality measures by 
averaging the pictorial and the profile distance measures of the ingroup and of the outgroup 
separately. Multiple regressions on these two indexes replicated results from Study 1: The 
interaction between status and complexity was in the predicted direction and significant for 
ingroup prototypicality (β = -.20, p = .008) but not significantly different from zero for 
outgroup prototypicality (β = -.08, p = .34). 
Discussion 
Study 2 aimed to test our hypotheses in a paradigm with greater external validity than 
in Study 1. The correlational analysis revealed the expected pattern of results. The relation 
between more complex perceptions of the inclusive category and RIP perceptions was 
positive for lower-status groups’ members and negative for higher-status group’s members.  
Although inclusive categories are usually positively valued, it is also true that people 
can belong to negatively stigmatized ones, such as, for instance, criminals, prostitutes, drug 
addicts, or the homeless. Like positive categories, such negative self-categories can contain 
subgroups, and some of these subgroups are likely to be perceived as more prototypical of 
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those negative inclusive categories than others. The United States, for example, are 
characterized as a country with a relatively high crime rate, and African Americans are seen 
by many as more prototypical of criminals than European Americans (Correll, Park, Judd, & 
Wittenbrink, 2002; Eberhardt, Goff, Purdie, & Davies, 2004). 
Whereas members of dominant groups tend to have the power to distance themselves 
from negatively valued inclusive categories, this is usually more difficult for members of 
dominated groups. Thus, as in the example of African Americans’ prototypicality for criminal 
Americans, minority groups often carry the stigma of being highly prototypical for negatively 
valued inclusive categories. The question is whether a complex representation of such 
categories can be a way to challenge this negative stereotype of minorities.  
In order to answer this question we conducted another study to complement Studies 1 
and 2 by (1) analysing the moderating role of status asymmetries for RIP in contexts in which 
an inclusive category is negatively valued as compared to contexts in which it is positively 
valued, and (2) the differential effect of complex representations of a self-relevant negative – 
as compared to a positive - inclusive category for both lower and higher-status groups. We 
expected that lower-status groups would perceive themselves, and would be perceived by 
higher-status groups, to be more prototypical for a negatively valued shared inclusive 
category but only when the representation of this category is simple (vs. complex).  
Study 3 
The experiment was conducted with social sciences students (Sociology and 
Psychology) and natural sciences students (Engineering, Physics, and Applied Mathematics) 
of three Portuguese public universities. In the Portuguese context there is a tendency to 
attribute different status to these two groups. Accordingly, as we expected that natural 
science students would be consensually seen as having higher status than social science 
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students we intended to use course as an equivalent of relative status. The inclusive category 
was “Undergraduate students from public Portuguese universities”.  
Method 
Design. A 2 (representation of the inclusive category: complex vs. simple) X 2 
(valence of the inclusive category: positive vs. negative) X 2 (relative ingroup status: higher 
vs. lower) between-subjects design was used. Participants from the two groups were 
randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions.  
Participants and procedure. Participants were 160 undergraduate students from 
public Portuguese universities, 65 from social sciences and 95 from natural sciences (56.9% 
female) with a mean age of 22 years (SD = 3.0). 
Participants were invited to fill in a questionnaire about undergraduate students from 
public Portuguese universities. After some initial general questions for demographic data 
such as sex, age, and some academic information (Faculty/University and attendance year), 
the valence of the inclusive category was manipulated, followed by the manipulation of the 
representation of the inclusive category, manipulation checks and measures of the dependent 
variables. At the end students were thanked and after completion of the study they were 
debriefed by email. 
Manipulations. 
Valence of the inclusive category. A fake quotation from an article of a well-known 
Portuguese newspaper was presented reflecting on the employment situation of 
undergraduate students as well as the discrepancy between what students learn at university 
and actual demands of the job market. After that, a task was presented: “We all know that 
there are different opinions about undergraduate students from Portuguese public universities. 
Imagine that you are the responsible person of the human resources department at a certain 
enterprise…”. In the condition of negative [positive] valence, participants were asked to 
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justify in a written statement why they would reject [choose] a student of a Portuguese public 
university who had applied for a job.  
Representation of the inclusive category. This variable was manipulated adapting the 
manipulation used by Waldzus et al. (2003, 2005) and in Study 1: Participants were to 
imagine that a tourist asked them what undergraduate students from public Portuguese 
universities were like. Depending on whether a complex [simple] representation was primed, 
they were asked to write down how they would explain the diversity of undergraduate 
students [what the typical undergraduate students are like] in public Portuguese universities.  
Measures. 
Manipulation checks. Valence of the inclusive category was measured with a single 
item (“Generally speaking, the image that I have about undergraduate students from public 
Portuguese universities is”…) on a Likert-type scale from 1 (completely negative) to 7 
(completely positive). Three items (e.g., “There is not just one type of students”, α = .57), two 
of them reversed coded, were used to measure complexity of the representation of the 
inclusive category on a scale from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree).  
Relative ingroup status. Two pictorial measures were used to measure ingroup and 
outgroup status perceptions. Each measure consisted of a vertical arrow pointing to the top, 
with seven horizontal lines, from the lowest (1) to the highest (7) status position. Participants 
were asked to indicate on each of the vertical scales their perceptions of each group’s status. 
Relative ingroup status was the difference between ingroup status and outgroup status. 
Relative ingroup prototypicality. Two different measures of RIP were used, namely 
(1) a pictorial measure, and (2) an attribute based measure. The pictorial measure was the 
same as the pictorial measure in Study 1.  The attribute based measure was adopted from 
previous studies on complexity effects (Waldzus et al., 2003). In a first step, participants were 
asked to list up to four attributes that were characteristic for subgroup members belonging to 
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the ingroup (i.e., students of social sciences or students of natural sciences) as compared to 
the outgroup. In a second step they were asked to list up to four attributes that were 
characteristic for members of the outgroup as compared to the ingroup. Finally, they were 
asked to rate on a scale ranging from 1 (does not apply at all) to 7 (applies absolutely) how 
much these ingroup typical and outgroup typical attributes applied to members of the 
superordinate category (i.e., undergraduate students in public higher education). The average 
of ratings on ingroup [outgroup] typical attributes was an indicator of ingroup [outgroup] 
prototypicality.  Relative ingroup prototypicality indices were calculated for both measures 
by subtracting outgroup prototypicality from ingroup prototypicality. As preliminary analysis 
did not indicate any interaction with type of measure a composite score was calculated by z-
standardizing and averaging the two relative ingroup prototypicality indices. 
Results 
Manipulation checks. Three univariate GLMs were performed with valence, 
representation of the inclusive category and course as factors. First, results showed a 
marginally significant main effect of the valence manipulation on the valence manipulation 
check, F(1, 152) = 3.5, p = .06, ηp2 = .023. In the positive valence condition the inclusive 
category was evaluated more positively (M = 4.97, SD = 0.99), than in the negative valence 
condition (M = 4.69, SD = 0.93).  
Second, representation of the inclusive category had a significant main effect on the 
manipulation check of this variable, F(1, 152) = 5.88, p = .02, ηp2 = .037. No other significant 
effects were found. Participants in the high complexity condition tended to perceive the inclusive 
category as being more diverse (M = 5.08, SD = 0.82) than participants in the low complexity 
condition (M = 4.70, SD = 1.00). Thus, we considered that both manipulations were successful.  
The third GLM showed a main effect of group status on measured relative ingroup status, 
F(1, 152) = 106.30, p < .001, ηp2  = .41. As predicted, social science students were overall seen 
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as having lower-status (M = -0.87, SD = 1.28) than natural science students (M = 1.72, SD = 
1.7), unqualified by participant group. However, unexpectedly not all participants shared the 
view that natural science students have higher status than social science students as 28% of them 
saw either equal status or the reversed status relation. Since group status was not an 
experimental, but a quasi-experimental variable, we therefore created a new categorical group 
status variable coded -1 if the ingroup was seen by the participant as having lower status than the 
outgroup and coded 1 in all other cases, that is, equal or higher relative status of the ingroup 
compared to the outgroup.3  
Effects on relative ingroup prototypicality. The hypothesis was tested in a 2 (valence 
of the inclusive category: positive vs. negative) x 2 (representation of the inclusive category: 
simple vs. complex) x 2 (relative ingroup status: low vs. equal/high) GLM with the composite 
measure of relative ingroup prototypicality as dependent variable. In order to account for non-
normality of the dependent variable we applied bootstrapping with 1000 bootstrap samples and 
used bias-corrected accelerated confidence intervals when estimating mean comparisons. Results 
showed the predicted significant 3-way interaction between representation of the inclusive 
category, relative ingroup status and valence, F(1, 152) = 7.04, p = .009, ηp2 = .044 (Table 1, 
Figure 2). No other effect was significant, Fs (1, 152) < 1.20, ps > .27. In order to understand the 
interaction effect we performed separate GLMs in the simple and complex conditions. As 
expected, the valence x status interaction was significant in the simple condition, F(1, 77) = 
6.80, p = .011, ηp2 = .08, but not in the complex condition,   F(1, 75) = 1.53, p = .22, ηp2 = .02.  
Simple mean comparisons indicated that in the condition where a simple representation of the 
inclusive category was primed members of the lower-status group tended to perceive their 
ingroup as being more relatively prototypical for a negative inclusive category than the members 
of the equal/higher status groups did (Difference = 0.42, SE = 0.21, p = .037, 95% CI [0.05, 
0.81]) whereas members of the equal/higher status groups tended to perceive their ingroup as 
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being more relatively prototypical for a positive inclusive category than the members of the 
lower status groups did (Difference = 0.54, SE = 0.24, p = .025, 95% CI [0.07, 1.05]). There 
were no differences between status groups in the complex condition (ps >.168).  In the simple 
condition, negative as compared to positive valence of the inclusive category marginally 
decreased relative ingroup prototypicality for members of the equal/higher status group 
(Difference = -0.36, SE = 0.21, p = .098, 95% CI [-0.78, 0.07]) and increased it for members of 
the lower status group (Difference = 0.61, SE = 0.33, p = .068, 95% CI [-0.05, 1.26]). There was 
no valence effect in the complex condition (ps >.185). Finally, the effect of complexity of the 
inclusive category for members of the lower status group was significantly negative for a 
negative inclusive category (Difference = -0.61, SE = 0.24, p = .014, 95% CI [-1.08, -0.14]) and 
marginally positive for a positive inclusive category (Difference = 0.44, SE = 0.24, p = .062, 
95% CI [-0.01, 0.93]). For members of the equal/higher status group the effects were the 
opposite but not significant, (Difference = 0.14, SE = 0.21, p = .497, 95% CI [-0.23, 0.55]) and 
(Difference = -0.29, SE = 0.26, p = .27, 95% CI [-0.79, 0.15]), respectively. 
Separate tests for ingroup prototypicality and outgroup prototypicality measures revealed 
that the three-way interaction was marginal for ingroup prototypicality, F(1, 152) = 2.79, p = 
.097, ηp2 = .018, and the opposite, but not significant for outgroup prototypicality, F(1, 152) = 
2.26, p = .135, ηp2 = .015. Nevertheless, differences in effect sizes are negligible so that in this 
study the target interaction on relative prototypicality seems to be driven by ingroup and 
outgroup prototypicality effects equally.   
[insert Figure 2] 
 [insert Table 1] 
Discussion 
Study 3 had the twofold goal of (1) testing the moderating role of status asymmetries 
for RIP in contexts in which an inclusive category is negatively as compared to positively 
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valued, and (2) analysing the differential effect of complex (vs. simple) representations of a 
given negatively valued (vs. positively valued) inclusive category for both lower and higher-
status groups. Consistent with Studies 1 and 2, members of the higher-status group perceived 
themselves as relatively more prototypical of the positively valued inclusive category than 
members of the lower-status group did, and this difference was eliminated by priming 
complexity of this inclusive category. As expected, the pattern was reversed for the 
negatively valued inclusive category. Prototypicality judgments are therefore context-
dependent and affected by reality constraints (e.g., Spears, Jetten, & Doosje, 2001; Ufkes et 
al., 2012). These results replicate, but also go beyond, previous research (Devos & Banaji, 
2005; Devos, Gavin, & Quintana, 2010; Waldzus et al., 2004) as they show such constraints 
for prototypicality also within negative inclusive categories. 
 Moreover, Study 3 shows that a more complex representation of a given inclusive 
category led lower-status groups to claim, and higher-status groups to admit, more equality in 
terms of relative prototypicality not only for positive but also for negative inclusive 
categories.  
Although prototypicality claims are not always directly motivated by the intergroup 
relation (Machunsky, Meiser, & Mummendey, 2009; Rosa & Waldzus, 2012), lower-status 
groups may use complexity strategically to cope with a negative social identity (Kessler & 
Mummendey, 2002; Kessler et al., 2010): Compared to a simple (or well-defined) inclusive 
category, a complex representation provides them with a chance to distance themselves from 
such a negative category (e.g., Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje,1999) and 
consequently shun a negative group image that confirms negative stereotypes. Moreover, in 
line with Sindic and Reicher (2008) one might argue that projection varies according to group 
interests: Claiming non-prototypicality of negative inclusive categories may provide group 
members with a better strategic position in the relevant social context (e.g., the job market).  
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General Discussion  
The purpose of the current paper was to test whether complex representations of 
inclusive categories can help groups to reduce differences in terms of intergroup 
prototypicality perceptions for shared inclusive categories when such categories are 
positively and negatively valued. While previous research had shown such effect for higher 
status groups’ RIP for positive inclusive categories, the three studies reported in this paper 
show that a different but complementary process can be observed for lower-status groups. 
Additionally, results of Study 3 show that this dynamic is context dependent, as a complex 
representation of the inclusive category also reduced the reversed RIP differences between a 
higher-status and a lower-status group for a negatively valued inclusive category.  
Our results have several theoretical and practical implications. First they support the 
argument that, in order to fully understand intergroup dynamics, our theoretical models need 
to take into account the differential perspectives of advantaged and disadvantaged groups 
(e.g., Dovidio et al., 2008; Dovidio et al., 2009; Demoulin, Leyens, & Dovidio, 2009; Wright, 
Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990).  
Secondly, when relating these very specific results to a broader social identity 
perspective, complex inclusive categories seem to have a particular function in the identity 
management of lower-status groups that helps to overcome some of the negative implications 
of such a lower-status position (e.g., Ellemers et al., 1997). One might argue that making 
salient that groups share an inclusive category can help lower-status groups’ members to 
believe that there might be a chance for mobility toward the higher-status group that belongs 
to the shared inclusive category (e.g., González & Brown, 2005) or to have a better relation 
with members of the higher-status group (e.g., Ellemers, Doosje, van Knippenberg, & Wilke, 
1992). However, this might not be enough as pervasive differences in prototypicality can 
prevent social mobility and perpetuate disadvantage that is implied in holding the lower-
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status position. Research on social identity theory has shown that in secure intergroup 
relations (with stable, legitimate status differences) lower-status groups often use social 
creativity strategies when there is little chance for social change (e.g., Jackson, Sullivan, 
Harnish, & Hodge, 1996; Mummendey et al., 1999; Terry, Carey, & Callan, 2001). We argue 
that complex inclusive categories can play a central role for lower-status groups in particular. 
As prototypicality is a basis of legitimate social status (Weber et al., 2002) as well as group 
privileges and entitlements (Wenzel, 2004), complex inclusive categories may be a way to 
turn a secure (stable, legitimate) asymmetric intergroup relation into an insecure one, opening 
the door for social change, and consequently for increasing the in-group’s social status.  
Thirdly, it is particularly encouraging that complexity has an impact on both higher 
and lower-status groups’ prototypicality perceptions, as such social change via complexity 
may theoretically even be driven by consensus between the two groups rather than by conflict 
(see, however, Dixon et al., 2012). Beliefs in asymmetric relative prototypicality, whether 
shared between higher and lower-status groups or controversial (e.g., Waldzus et al., 2004), 
may be influenced by increasing the complexity of representations of inclusive categories 
towards a converging, consensual belief in equal prototypicality of both groups.  Several 
historical developments such as reduction in institutionalized racism and sexism and the 
decriminalization of homosexuals in several societies can be understood from such a 
perspective (e.g., Subasic, Reynolds, & Turner, 2008). Those developments would not have 
been possible without the establishment of equality norms that are shared by a large 
proportion of members of both higher and lower-status groups. Complex representations of 
inclusive categories can facilitate the establishment of such norms. More research is therefore 
needed that investigates the emergence of complex superordinate identity representations and 
their effects on the normative bases of intergroup behaviour.  
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Although the use of different groups and methods in the three studies may allow a 
certain generalization of our results, two other limitations require additional research on the 
role of complexity of inclusive categories. First, we did not address the question whether 
higher and lower-status groups hold already by default different representations of inclusive 
categories. Several recent studies suggest such differences. For instance, adopting Berry’s 
(1984) cultural relations model, Dovidio and colleagues (2008) report several studies that 
show that majority members usually prefer a one-group model (assimilationist), whereas 
minority members hold a more pluralistic integration representation of that category (see also 
Leach, Brown, & Worden, 2008). One could speculate that complex representations may only 
have the potential to change intergroup relations if they are consensually shared by both, the 
higher and the lower-status group. Second, in our studies we intentionally confounded 
numerical with social status for reasons of simplicity. Although social status seems to be a 
more central determinant of intergroup relations than group size (e.g., Ellemers et al., 1992; 
Tajfel, 1978) with regard to ingroup bias (e.g., Ellemers & Barreto, 2001; González & 
Brown, 2006), different effects of these two variables might be expected on relative 
prototypicality perceptions. Future studies may be able to disentangle both variables by 
orthogonally manipulating social status and the groups’ numerical size.  
Overall, our findings suggest that it may be beneficial to encourage groups involved 
in undesired but pervasive intergroup inequalities to consider the normative-comparative 
context to be complex and multifaceted. For instance, Sibley and Barlow (2009) examined to 
what extent members of two majority groups (ethnically European Australians and New 
Zealanders) considered minority groups (Aboriginal Australians and Maori, respectively) in 
their cognitive representations of nationhood. Similar to other studies (e.g., Devos & Banaji, 
2005; Devos et al., 2010), they found that European Australians automatically associate their 
ingroup more strongly than the outgroup with the inclusive category “Australia”. More 
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interestingly, however, European New Zealanders associated both their own group and the 
minority group (Maori) with the shared inclusive category (New Zealand). These findings 
highlight what important implications sociocultural and normative differences have for 
intergroup relations. Particularly, they show that it is possible to change the representation of 
a given inclusive category in a way that fosters inclusion and social recognition of minority 
groups. Increasing the representation of minority groups in public institutions and in the 
media, by promoting symbolic markers of those groups, for example, can be seen as a 
promising way of changing the cognitive representation of inclusive categories (Sibley & 
Barlow, 2009). 
Research on identity complexity (e.g, Brewer & Pierce, 2005; Roccas & Brewer, 
2002), multiple categorizations (e.g., Crisp, 2006; Crisp & Hewstone, 2007, Crisp, Hewstone, 
& Rubin, 2001; Deschamps & Doise, 1978; Hall & Crisp, 2005) or multicultural ideological 
beliefs (Correll, Park, & Smith, 2008; Park & Judd, 2005; Wolsko, Park, & Judd, 2006) have 
been examples of approaches toprejudice reduction. Our research contributes to this broader 
line of research on the advantages that complex representations and identities can have when 
searching for ways to prevent intergroup discrimination and conflict. Ehrke et al. (2014) 
recently demonstrated that it is possible to design interventions based on the theoretical 
assumption that increased perceived diversity of superordinate groups improve outgroup 
attitudes, with improvement not only shown in the short term but also with longer-lasting 
effects. Superordinate complexity seems to carry the potential for both contesting problematic 
intergroup relations and reaching intergroup consensus at a higher-order societal level, and 
may present a constructive answer to the challenge of increasing diversity in our society. 
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Footnotes 
 
 
1 Because this study used a natural intergroup context and identification levels were 
considerably high for most participants, we did not exclude participants with low 
identification scores.  
2 The attributes correspond to self-generated attributes from a pre-test. Participants 
generated a maximum of four items that characterize either ingroup or outgroup members. 
The eight attributes most frequently mentioned were used for developing the profile 
dissimilarity measure of the current study. 
3 Participants with equal and higher status perceptions were joined in this latter 
category. One reason was that there were not enough participants claiming equal status to test 
effects for them separately. More importantly, however, based on the ingroup projection 
model we expected them to show the same tendencies as higher status groups, that is 
claiming high vs. low relative ingroup prototypicality for positive vs. negative superordinate 
categories, respectively, and an attenuation of these claims by inducing a complex 
superordinate category.  
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Figure Caption 
Figure 1. Relative ingroup prototypicality (difference between ingroup and outgroup 
prototypicality) according to participants in the different experimental conditions in Study 1. 
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Figure Caption 
 
Figure 2. Estimated marginal means and 95% confidence intervals of relative 
prototypicality of the ingroup (mean differences between the ingroup and the outgroup) for the 
equal/higher and lower-status group as a function of valence and complexity of the inclusive 
category.  
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Table 1 
Ingroup (IG) and outgroup (OG) prototypicality for members of groups with lower and 
equal/higher relative status depending on manipulated complexity of the negatively or 
positively valued inclusive category for the attribute based and the pictorial  prototypicality 
measure. 
 
 
                                  Valence of the inclusive category 
  Positive Negative 
  Inclusive category representation Inclusive category representation 
  Simple Complex Simple Complex 
  IG OG IG OG IG OG IG OG 
Ingroup Status Prototypicality (attribute-based) 
Lower  M 4.27 4.57 4.69 4.19 4.77 4.44 4.52 4.93 
 SD 0.91 0.70 0.81 0.61 0.78 0.72 1.02 0.80 
Equal/higher  M 4.49 4.08 4.32 4.22 4.61 4.49 4.56 4.44 
 SD 0.97 0.76 0.89 1.02 0.84 0.80 0.76 1.02 
  Prototypicality (pictorial) 
Lower  M 4.42 4.58 4.50 4.42 5.42 4.67 4.67 4.67 
 SD 1.16 1.24 1.62 1.56 1.16 1.61 1.37 1.97 
Equal/higher  M 4.62 4.14 4.65 4.62 4.71 4.89 5.24 5.03 
 SD 1.47 1.38 1.81 1.60 1.54 1.29 1.64 1.61 
 
